|Event Date/Time: Mar 15, 2013||End Date/Time: Mar 16, 2013|
One, under the heading â€œmetaphysics of science,â€ is about whether any purported distinction between
nomological and metaphysical necessity is dissolved if natural kinds have essential, causally-relevant
properties. Another, under the heading â€œmodal metaphysics,â€ concerns what, if anything, makes necessity
claims true. These conversations prompted the thought that an exploration of necessity that crosses
philosophical sub-disciplines could be fruitful. A general investigation into the nature of necessity would
welcome approaches from logic, philosophy of language, epistemology, as well as metaphysics and
philosophy of science, and consider such questions as:
What does it mean for a claim to be necessarily true?
If any claims are necessarily true, what accounts for that? What are the truth-makers or â€œgroundsâ€ for necessity claims?
How do we know that a claim is not only true, but necessarily true? How can necessity claims be epistemically justified?
Are there different kinds of necessity claims: logical, metaphysical, physical â€¦? If so, do different necessities differ with respect to their grounds, or epistemic accessibility?
How is necessity related to analyticity, essence, natural kind, power, cause, or natural law?